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THE DIALOGIC ASPECT OF SOFT LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY:
DISCORD, DIGRESSION, AND DEVELOPMENT
John A. E. Pottow
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) is well known for its success in promulgating soft law in-
struments in the insolvency realm, offering a panoply of practice guides, 
legislative guides, principles, and, of course, model laws.1 While not shy 
about drafting hard law conventions, UNCITRAL does seem to have devel-
oped a penchant for the model law “technology” as its preferred vehicle for 
cross-border insolvency matters.2 Model laws occupy a special space in the 
soft law universe. They certainly seem quite “soft” under most definitions of 
the term “soft law,”3 at least in their initial stage. But model laws are often 
drafted with the hope of “hardening” into full domestic law. Thus, it is per-
haps better to think of them as exercises of semi-soft law or contingently soft 
law.4
Moreover, the hard law toward which soft laws ultimately aspire is 
good old domestic law that binds private citizens, not the creation of an in-
ternational obligation under, for example, traditional Westhphalian statist 
notions to bind only states inter se. Thus, a model law’s contingency is to 
ripen into what we might think of in the international law sphere as super-
hard law: binding duties on domestic citizens under municipal law. Fur-
thermore, model laws are not just teleological in their evolutionary trajecto-
ry. They also carry the risk that they will never complete their journey. Spe-
cifically, they are go-it-alone exercises of faith that one country enacts 
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1. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, A Guide to UNCITRAL: Basic Facts About 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf.
2. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization in 
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 475, 479 (2007).
3. Amelia H. Boss, The Evolution of Commercial Law Norms: Lessons To Be Learned 
from Electronic Commerce, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 673, 674 n.9 (2009).
4. Henry Deeb Gabriel, The Advantages of Soft Law in International Commercial 
Law: The Role of UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and the Hague Conference, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
655, 664 (2009); John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International 
Bankruptcy, 24 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 984–88 (2005).
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domestically to bind its private actors with no guarantee of reciprocation 
(and, indeed, no liability precondition of reciprocity) from other states.5
Assuming for the sake of this discussion that the model laws promul-
gated by UNCITRAL are indeed soft laws, we might learn much from stud-
ying these instruments to learn how they exploit the unique status of soft 
law to incrementally advance international cooperation in insolvency.6 This 
would not be the first such analysis. The path-breaking sociological studies 
of Block-Lieb, Carruthers, and Halliday offer elegant insight into the heter-
ogeneous factors at play in even such seemingly technocratic an internation-
al regime as insolvency.7 The analysis of this modest Article, however, will 
bring something new to the table by being the first to tackle an important 
new development: UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Recognition 
and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments (“IRJ model law”), 
which is hot off the presses, having been adopted by the Commission just in 
the summer of 2018.
In this study, I describe three important articles in the IRJ model law 
and discuss their development, drawing in part upon my experience as a 
delegate to UNCITRAL Working Group V. In doing so, I want to situate 
these developments within the broader discussions of international law and 
international relations theory regarding soft law. Doing so will both vindi-
cate and puzzle some of the conventional understanding of how soft law in-
struments tend to function, although some of the conclusions must neces-
sarily be conjectural at this stage.
The literature on international soft law is enormous, and while there is 
far from uniform consensus regarding such matters as its legitimacy (its 
“pathology” in Weil’s words),8 or even its efficacy,9 few as a descriptive 
matter deny its prevalence. Despite these spirited disagreements, some 
common threads do seem to emerge. One is a consensus that soft law on the 
5. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 171, 188–92 (2010). To be precise, the international drafting of a model law by an 
institution such as UNCITRAL is a two-stage exercise, with risk at both the international and 
national level. The first (international) risk is that UNCITRAL adopts the law but no country 
enacts it. The second (national) risk is that described in the text: that an enacting state subjects 
itself to restrictions that may not be reciprocated by exploitative, free-riding, or simply clue-
less peers. 
6. Pottow, supra note 4, at 984–92.
7. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS (2017); Terence C. Halli-
day & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National 
Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135, 
1135–02 (2007).
8. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM.
J. INT’L L. 413, 413 (1983).
9. Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 167–82
(1996). 
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whole is less costly than hard law and hence, by corollary, easier to enact.10
Indeed, as others have observed, the less certain the preferences of interna-
tional policymakers, the more attractive soft law becomes.11 Second, soft 
law is rarely intended to be static and often serves as a way-station toward 
hard law (most transparently in the technology of a model law) and thus of-
ten anticipates change.12 Thus, soft law is both comparatively easy and in-
tentionally transient.
Building on this second point, and interweaving one of the more inter-
esting attempts to justify the normative authority of international law, is a 
Habermasian view that international law in general and soft law in particu-
lar has an intrinsically discursive (and recursive) nature.13 That is, whatever 
the transparency of an international norm’s origination, its ultimate justifica-
tion comes through contestation and debate in the international public space. 
From this, I draw the conclusion (shared by Chinkin and others) that a prin-
cipal attribute of soft law is an intentionally inchoate character, where it de-
liberately seeks to be dialogue-provoking.14 In short, soft law instruments 
seek to further a conversation about evolving international norms in a con-
text where there is not yet uniform consensus; intentionally, their softness 
allows for flexibility and, in terms of Abbot and Snidal’s axes of commit-
ment, precision, and obligation, for further development along various 
“pathways.”15
10. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 5, at 177.
11. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Govern-
ance, 54 Int’l Org. 421, 441–44 (2000).
12. C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in Interna-
tional Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 856–57 (1989) (“[T]hat the principles contained in a 
soft law instrument have become transformed into hard law[] rest[s] upon an assertion that 
subsequent State practice has changed the status of the principles. It may also be urged that 
this very transformation was a major goal of the formulation of the principles. The requisite 
State practice may be the inclusion of principles originally expressed in soft law forms into 
treaties, although it is likely that the language would have to be adapted to create hard obliga-
tions. Such action represents a deliberate choice on the part of States parties to the treaty to 
change the status of the principles.”).
13. E.g., Matthias Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King: Past, Present, 
and Future Approaches to International Soft Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 335 (2012).
14. Others have delved into more detail on the forces at play. E.g., Kenneth W. Abbott 
& Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International Cooperation, in THE IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 50 
(Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2009) (identifying both three important dimensions of 
cooperation (substantive content, participation, and legalization) and three “pathways” to co-
operation that correspond to the three dimensions); see also Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. 
Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International 
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706 (2010) (arguing that international hard and soft law in-
struments can serve not only as alternatives or complements but also as antagonists to each 
other).
15. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14. Again, I do not claim this is unique to soft law. As 
mentioned in the text, many justify international law itself through such a discursive attribute, 
but it strikes me that this particular dialogic aspect of law is magnified in soft law, which, on 
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With these attributes of soft law in mind, I turn to analyze the IRJ mod-
el law (in particular, three specific articles) to show some of the benefits and 
pitfalls of this dialogic aspect of soft law. While the analysis proceeds skep-
tically, suggesting that the dialogic aspects of soft law may be overrated, it 
ultimately ends on a positive note, highlighting an important development in 
international jurisdictional law the IRJ model law advanced—an advance-
ment made possible by its soft nature. To understand the IRJ model law, 
however, we must start with UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (“MLCBI”),16 to which the IRJ model law was a modular re-
finement.17
I.  Soft Law’s Invitation for Discourse: The MLCBI
UNCITRAL’s enactment of the MLCBI transformed the field of inter-
national bankruptcy. Its history is well-documented elsewhere,18 but it bears 
repeating just how precarious the international environment was that forged 
the MLCBI. Various states harbored strongly held (and divergent) convic-
tions regarding insolvency jurisdictional policies that are often referred to as 
“territorialism” and “universalism.”19 The MLCBI cut through the Gordian 
knot (roughly contemporaneous with what would become the cognate EU 
Insolvency Regulation) by pushing modest acclimation of foreign insolven-
cy law along a proceduralist vector.20 This approach permitted the buy-in of 
skeptical states worried about the unwelcome sovereignty costs of ceding 
some international control in bankruptcy cases that might force them to sub-
ject locally situated assets to foreign rules of priority and distribution, some 
of the most sensitive aspects of insolvency law.
Many credited the MLCBI’s status as soft law as critical to its success. 
Yet the various axes of softness matter, for it was not just along the vector 
of commitment that the MLCBI was of course soft (which, to be, sure, 
played a large role in its attractiveness to many states) but also its preci-
at least a teleological conception, envisions transformation into hard law. The mechanism of 
this transformation on this teleological view is premised upon ongoing dialogue.
16. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO 
ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997) [hereinafter MLCBI].
17. John A. E. Pottow, International Insolvency Law’s Cross-Roads and the New Mod-
ularity, in 4 MODERNIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW TO SUPPORT INNOVATION AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE CONGRESS
30 (2017), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/17-
06783_ebook.pdf.
18. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, supra note 1.
19. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2276, 2277 (2000).
20. Pottow, supra note 4, at 988–1001.
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sion.21 Specifically, many of the substantive provisions were left intentional-
ly open-ended, such as the concept of adequate protection of creditors,22 just 
as the scope of obligation remained often discretionary—lots of mays
amidst the few shalls.23 To be fair, though, it was not 100 percent soft all the 
way down. There was perhaps an intermediate level of commitment. Name-
ly, although the MLCBI was awash with mays, there were also some key 
shalls, the most important of which pertained to the recognition of foreign 
proceedings.24 This mandatory term implemented a jurisdictional hierarchy 
favoring the lex fori concursus when the insolvency proceeding was being 
conducted at the debtor’s Centre of Main Interests (“COMI”).25 Still, the 
point remains that the precision dimension was at most intermediate. Some 
of the most contentious issues (for example, choice of law rules) were elid-
ed.
This “mostly softness” allowed low-stakes buy-in for matters of proce-
dural cooperation and discretionary assistance in insolvency proceedings. 
Thus, the soft law project of the MLCBI was necessarily incomplete. Both 
the doctrinal scaffolding (COMI) and the scope of cooperation (“may as-
sist”) were left to be tested through future use. Similarly, the international 
amenability for cooperation was left to mature over time, likely with the in-
tention that with greater familiarity and usage would come greater willing-
ness to allow foreign insolvency law to affect locally situated assets and 
creditors. Indeed, an express provision of the Model Law commands con-
sideration of its international origin in domestic interpretation, telegraphing 
that the filling in of content was meant to be conducted over time and across 
borders.26 The discourse promoted by soft law was not just foreseen but 
planned.
Accordingly, the half-full (more than half-full, really) analysis of the 
MLCBI is that it succeeded in garnering an international consensus when 
21. John A.E. Pottow, Cross-Border Corporate Insolvency in the Era of Soft(ish) Law,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW (Barry Adler ed., forthcoming 
2019).
22. See, e.g., MLCBI, supra note 16, art. 21, ¶ 2.
23. E.g., id. arts. 19, 21.
24. Scoring the delegation of a model law is a difficult affair: it is bipartite because, at 
stage one, no state is obligated to do anything other than perhaps consider in good faith 
whether to enact the model law as domestic legislation (low delegation), but at stage two, 
once enacted, the legal obligation for enforcement catapults to complete justiciability in do-
mestic courts (high delegation).
25. MLCBI, supra note 16, art. 29(a)(ii).
26. See id. art. 8. Doubtless to the horror of some reactionary legislators, U.S. courts 
are now not just permitted but instructed to look at foreign jurisprudence interpreting provi-
sions of the MLCBI. 11 U.S.C. 1508 (2012). And that has happened. See In re Oi Brasil Hold-
ings Coöperatief U.A., 578 B.R. 169, 206–08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re Tri-Continental 
Exch., 349 B.R. 627, 633–34 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006). This pluralistic development of a sort 
of “common law,” cf. Guzman & Meyer, supra note 5, at 201–07 (discussing common law 
aspects of international law), has benefits to harmonization, which in turn facilitates future 
further cooperation.
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countless attempts at prior international insolvency conventions (both re-
gional and global) failed. The half-empty analysis, of course, is that it did 
not do all that much and hid from all the tough subjects. But the more opti-
mistic view seems to have won the day. For example, the COMI concept 
rolled out and became solidified (and clarified) in the EU Insolvency Regu-
lation Recast, and a body of jurisprudence has now developed in an at least 
somewhat-harmonizing field of cross-border insolvency.27 Moreover, the 
adoption rate of the MLCBI has been, despite some doom-and-gloomers, 
relatively impressive in terms of its breadth.28
Risk abounds in such instruments that depend upon future agents to de-
lineate their content: as with a box of chocolates, you never know what 
you’re gonna get. And while it might appear that fragmenting interpretation 
pluralistically offers some diversification benefit, as was learned the hard 
way in 2008 with the derivatives market, sometimes it can actually concen-
trate risk. In this context, the risk is that, when a renegade opinion crops up, 
other states might feel obligated to propagate it through deferential interpre-
tation under the above-mentioned foreign interpretation clause. To be sure, 
there may be an expected-value neutrality to this risk as “crazy” opinions 
could equally number “helpful” ones, but states are not immune from risk 
aversion in areas of uncertainty.29 And that risk of the renegade opinion is 
exactly what unfolded in the second decade of the MLCBI’s international 
discourse.
In 2012, the United Kingdom, an important commercial jurisdiction, is-
sued what many considered a renegade opinion that surprisingly restricted 
the scope of available relief under the MLCBI. In Rubin v. Eurofinance, the 
U.K. Supreme Court (née House of Lords) held that a default judgment en-
tered in a U.S. chapter 11 proceeding, which was a foreign main proceeding 
afoot in the debtor’s COMI under the jurisdictional hierarchy of MLCBI, 
could not be enforced under the MLCBI’s expansive relief provisions in the 
United Kingdom.30 In contrast to the broad reach other courts applied to the 
MLCBI,31 the Rubin court went out of its way to explain that open-ended 
terms like “additional assistance” provided no textual foundation for relief 
27. Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 
O.J. (L 160) 1. Paragraph 13 of the preamble states: “The ‘centre of main interests’ should 
correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a reg-
ular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.” Id.
28. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143 (2005).
29. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 11, at 441–44.
30. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46.
31. See e.g., In re Rede Energia S.A., 515 B.R. 69, 98–99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (de-
clining to apply public policy exception despite potential distributional differences because 
“Brazilian bankruptcy law meets our fundamental standards of fairness and accords with the 
course of civilized jurisprudence.”); In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 473 B.R. 117, 123 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2012) (construing “manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States” as 
requiring contravention of the ‘most fundamental policies of the United States’), aff’d, 701 
F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Rede Energia, 515 B.R. 69.
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that the United Kingdom deemed unavailable under domestic law—namely, 
the recognition of an in personam judgment emanating from an insolvency 
proceeding in which jurisdiction was exercised in a manner not found under 
the common law Dicey rules.32 In other words, without attempting to show a 
violation of core norms of British fundamental justice or due process (the 
sort of standard indicated by MLCBI’s Guide to Enactment (“GTE”) regard-
ing sparing use of its public policy clause),33 the Rubin court merely bristled 
at the idea that the Americans “do it differently” in their rules of personal 
jurisdiction and forbad assistance. Indeed, the opinion went to pains to dis-
parage the vague language of the MLCBI and to note that, rather than pro-
vide flexibility to facilitate progressive development of remedies, its text 
provided a lack of clarity that should be construed strictly.34
The bankruptcy commentariat were not amused, and Rubin suffered 
some deservedly withering criticism.35 In fact, when UNCITRAL convened 
a colloquium to consider future projects for its insolvency working group 
shortly in the decision’s aftermath, high on the agenda was “fixing Rubin”
(although more delicately and felicitously expressed).36 Some took the view 
that Rubin was “just wrong” and so their own courts could simply interpret 
their versions of the MLCBI as not following that precedent. But others 
were worried about the spillover effect. For example, at one point, the Ko-
rean delegate to Working Group V noted that a Korean court would be in-
clined to consider the Rubin opinion as an interpretation of the MLCBI that 
could affect its scope in Korea.37 Thus, the discursive aspect of a soft law 
instrument (or, more precisely, a hard law instrument that started its life as a 
soft law instrument) that expressly relied upon cross-border interpretation 
became a source of concern not just for the United Kingdom (whose own 
delegation supported the need to fix Rubin) but for Korea as well.38
32. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46 at 5. Rubin can probably be read more broadly to reject the 
notion that any form of judgment recognition is not a form of available relief under the Model 
law.
33. MLCBI ¶ 104.
34. Id. at 41.
35. Rebecca R. Zubaty, Rubin v. Eurofinance: Universal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction or a 
Comity of Errors?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 38 (2011). 
36. Gordon Stewart, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Insolvency Derived 
Judgments – Rubin, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/
sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/b4_insolvency_derived_judgements_
1_stewart.pdf.
37. See generally Min Han, Recognition of Insolvency Effects of a Foreign Insolvency 
Proceeding: Focusing on the Effect of Discharge, in TRADE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH 
HARMONIZATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 345 (Muruga Perumal Ramaswamy & João Ribeiro 
eds., 2015) (discussing Koren law).
38. This is also true regarding hard law instruments, too. For example, international law 
generally commands states to consider other states’ interpretations of the text of a treaty. Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subse-
quent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the applica-
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II.  Soft Law’s Response to the Invitation for 
Discourse: The IRJ Model Law
The solution at UNCITRAL was to take on the project of the IRJ model 
law as a modular add-on to the existing MLCBI. This project would effec-
tively “overrule” a hard law pronouncement by a national court of last resort 
with a soft law instrument (and, in the process, signal a certain confidence 
that this soft law would apparently make the jump to hard law in due 
course). One might have thought that states that enacted the MLCBI as do-
mestic legislation could already tack this revision on as an amendment to 
clarify the scope of permissible cooperation. But, interestingly, UNCITRAL 
decided to create a standalone soft law instrument, not an amendment to the 
existing MLCBI. One reason for this was to enable jurisdictions that had not 
yet adopted the MLCBI to enact the IRJ model law independently. While it 
may seem curious to envision states that were unpersuaded by the benefits 
of the MLCBI to nonetheless adopt a new model law that in part fixes a po-
tential loophole in the prior model law, there was a method to that madness. 
First, “fixing Rubin” was not the only animation for the project. Some states 
seemed genuinely supportive of the idea of facilitating the recognition and 
enforcement of cross-border insolvency-related judgments, and so Rubin
was the inspiration, but not the sole justification, for the IRJ model law. 
Second, there were some state delegations who suggested off-record that, 
for whatever political reasons, although the MLCBI hit roadblocks to do-
mestic enactment, a standalone law could get greater traction and maybe 
even bring some of the benefits of the MLCBI through the side door.39 In-
deed, the IRJ model law could conceivably do so by exposing reluctant 
states to the experience of (and benefits from) greater cooperation regarding 
insolvency-related judgments, which in turn could shift their preferences to 
lessen reflexive hostility to the MLCBI’s potential to subordinate local 
law.40
Thus, UNCITRAL’s Working Group V decided to craft (perhaps un-
necessarily for some) a model law on insolvency-related judgments. It set to 
work in 2014, turning around a product in only four years—respectable tim-
ing by international standards. Consider, by contrast, that the Hague Con-
ference started futzing with its “new” choice of law convention in the 1990s 
with completion still nowhere in sight.41
tion of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which estab-
lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation[.]”).
39. Delving into this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Briefly, some states are 
resistant to the bifurcation of “main” and “non-main” proceedings and hence loathe the con-
cept of COMI, which serves as the doctrinal foundation of such bifurcation.
40. Pottow, supra note 17.
41. See Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Conclusions of the 
Special Commission of June 1992 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (1993), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/8c4a5159-9847-4bcc-85c4-58b9df9a847b.pdf (Special Commis-
sion on General Affairs and Policy referring the proposal to a Working Group for further con-
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What predictions would soft law theory offer for the IRJ model law? 
Several. First, the IRJ model law, as soft law, would be easy to enact—or, 
more precisely, easier to enact than a hard law treaty. Second, because con-
tinuing dialogues is always easier than initiating new ones, it would predict 
that the IRJ model law would be easier to complete than the MLCBI. The 
former could build upon the preexisting doctrinal scaffolding of the latter, 
which had to start a bold new project afresh. Third, the IRJ model law 
would be relatively uncontroversial given that the potentially most opposed 
state, the United Kingdom, supported the endeavor.42 This still further au-
gurs ease of enactment. All these characteristics would presumably lead to 
high degrees of precision, commitment, and delegation in a low-stakes tech-
nocratic context, portending quick passage of an instrument that could be 
well toward the hard end (zone?) of a multi-dimensional space.
To some extent, those predictions were borne out. As alluded, the in-
strument was put together relatively quickly by international law standards. 
But even so, and surprisingly in light of this ex ante theoretical prediction, 
some striking lack of consensus on several key components of the IRJ mod-
el law emerged. One was so intractable that it threatened to derail the entire 
project, and another proved so divisive that it required a “fudge” to get past 
the finish line. These two developments cast into doubt the supposed bene-
fits of soft law’s discursive feature in facilitating international law reform. 
But there is also a third provision that is noteworthy in the opposite respect, 
which tends to confirm the standard account of how soft law can indeed ad-
vance an ongoing international dialogue, so the glass is at least partially full. 
Each of these articles shall be discussed in turn.
A. Discourse Denouement: Overview of the IRJ Model Law
To understand the import of the three articles of the IRJ model law that 
will be discussed in some detail, a quick overview is required. As succinctly 
put in its first article, the short and sweet IRJ model law is intended for do-
mestic enactment as a unilateral offer to recognize foreign bankruptcy 
judgments:43 “This Law applies to the recognition and enforcement of an 
insolvency-related judgment issued in a State that is different to the State in 
sideration); Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Ongoing Work in the 
Area of Judgments (Jan. 2016), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/10f2d584-0f51-424b-8140-
3dab5bb3d2c9.pdf (outlining ongoing work in the area of judgments).
42. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 11, at 440–44. 
43. “Unilateral” because no reciprocity requirement is imposed. See generally Lau-
rence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice 
Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 571–72 (2016) (“Reciprocity . . . systematically dis-
courages persistent objection to emerging customs that involve reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions. Thus, in practice, the doctrine of persistent objectors poses little if any impediment to 
custom’s applicability to all nations.).
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which recognition and enforcement are sought.”44 The procedural require-
ments for recognition and enforcement are straightforward and minimal. 
They anticipate the use of a foreign judgment as a defense, not just as an af-
firmative cause of action.45 The obligation to recognize the foreign judgment 
shows a high degree of commitment; it is mandatory. It also shows a con-
tingently high degree of delegation, as the anticipation is that the initially 
soft law instrument will be enacted as fully enforceable municipal law. The 
critical Article 13 provides this precise commitment, subject to various im-
portant exceptions, instructing that “an insolvency-related judgment shall be 
recognized and enforced . . . .”46 Scaling back that mandatory, precise obli-
gation, however, is a long article that spells out multiple grounds upon 
which recognition and enforcement may be discretionarily refused,47 wholly 
in addition to the standard public policy escape clause found in myriad in-
ternational law instruments.48 Despite all these caveats, the clear intent of
the IRJ model law is to reject the approach of Rubin, as the GTE makes 
clear right up front in its second paragraph, noting:
The work on this topic has its origin, in part, in certain judicial de-
cisions that led to uncertainty concerning the ability of some courts, 
in the context of recognition proceedings under MLCBI, to recog-
nize and enforce judgments given in the course of foreign insolven-
cy proceedings.49
B. Discourse Discord: Article 2
While the IRJ model law looks short and sweet, it is now time to probe 
the experience in drafting three of its provisions in more depth in order to 
sharpen our understanding of the dialogic role of soft law in international 
insolvency. As discussed above, one of the virtues (or at least intentions) of 
soft law is the promotion of discursive dialogue both to justify the ultimate 
content of the law and to further develop and crystallize norms of consen-
sus. But not all dialogue yields consensus, and sometimes impasse develops. 
The unique deliberative procedures of UNCITRAL (praised by some,50
44. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INSOLVENCY-
RELATED JUDGMENTS WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, art. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.19.V.8 (2019) 
[hereinafter IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE]. Article 5 is an “outbound” provision that confers 
explicit authority on a domestic insolvency representative to seek recognition of a local judg-
ment in a foreign state. Id. art. 5. 
45. Id. art. 10.
46. Id. art. 13 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. See id. art. 7 (providing for public policy exceptions).
49. Id. ¶ 2 (citing Rubin, tactfully, with a “for example” modifier). 
50. Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 2. 
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pooh-poohed by others51) take consensus seriously. The formal power to 
vote is rarely exercised.52 As such, impasse does not typically lead to ma-
joritarian cram-down at UNCITRAL; elision, redirection, or capitulation 
carry the day. Thus, the outputs really do reflect a wide degree of consen-
sus.53
This consensus focus can have the paradoxical effect of sometimes 
front-loading friction points. Because the actors want consensus, they figure 
out—early—where they actually disagree and then try to hash out a worka-
ble solution that will be enacted (and not resisted) at the second stage of 
domestic incorporation.  The paradox arises because a primary feature of 
soft law is the ability to avoid friction points by allowing the deferral of res-
olution of contested matters through watering-down commitments, re-
striction of scope, etc., as occurred with the MLCBI. Seen this way, the im-
pulse to smoke out dissent is paradoxical because it underscores rather than 
downplays friction. Resolution may well require de-emphasizing the friction 
through, as mentioned, elision and/or watering down the precision of the 
apposite obligation, that is, by exploiting soft law’s softness.
Here, the most foundational disagreement was unexpected. In fact, any 
substantial disagreement was unexpected given the widespread support for 
the overall goal of providing for a quasi-mandatory recognition and en-
forcement scheme. Nonetheless, when it came time to start filling in the de-
tails, dissension arose over the initial definitional question of just what is an 
“insolvency-related judgment.” Specifically, discord developed over what 
actions could and could not be properly deemed “insolvency-related.” The 
source of this disagreement was perhaps a classic lack of “shared under-
standings,”54 but it more likely arose from a combination of jurisprudential 
path dependence and procedural-institutional disparity.
51. Gabriel, supra note 4, at 664. “While the atmosphere in UNCITRAL was political 
(because delegates represented governments, which were grouped in regional blocs), that in 
UNIDROIT was apolitical (because participants appeared in their private capacity).” Id. 
(quoting E. Allan Farnsworth, The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles, 72 
TUL. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 2. One such vote (the second in over a half-
century) occurred in 2018 during the selection of a chair for a new working group on invest-
ment treaties, which was remarkable in its rarity. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Report of Work-
ing Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fifth Ses-
sion, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/935 (May 14, 2018). 
53. My personal observation as a delegate is that the chair will sometimes declare that 
there seems to be a “prevailing view” when there is near-but-not-full consensus, which shifts 
the burden onto objectors to marshal allies or go quietly into the night. This is not to suggest 
bullying; the chair in such cases will even invite other delegations to speak up if they do not 
feel there is a prevailing view/consensus emerging, so it has more the air of a “speak now or 
forever hold your peace” than a “stop bothering us” message. Sometimes, further discussion 
emerges, and it is clear no consensus will obtain; other times, the potential dissent withers on 
the vine. Naturally, differing chairs are of course quicker or slower to detect consensus.
54. See Jaye Ellis, Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public International 
Law, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L., 313, 317 (2012).
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To understand this discord, the baseline exclusion of insolvency matters 
from prior choice of law conventions is the starting point. Insolvency law is 
carved out from many international hard law instruments concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgments.55 This is true going back to 
the original Brussels Convention, its updated Brussels I EU Regulation, its 
recent Recast, and the quasi-parallel Lugano Convention.56 So is it also true 
for the 1971 Hague Convention57 and the Hague’s most recent oeuvre, the 
Principles on Choice of Law in Contracts.58 (The policy behind this exclu-
sion in part stems from the deep normativity inherent in bankruptcy law.)59
An extant regime of international law—in this case, hard law on the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—has 
thus already had to grapple with the definition of an “insolvency-related 
judgment” for purposes of classifying proceedings that fall under an exclu-
sion.
Noting this partially invented wheel, the Secretariat of UNCITRAL—as 
a form of soft law cross-dialogue with other international regimes—drew 
the Working Group’s attention to these other international instruments as a 
source for a possible definition of “insolvency-related” for purposes of the 
IRJ model law, just as the observer from the EU was vocal in doing so at the 
meetings of Working Group V (and some delegates from European member 
states, too).60 Indeed, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) developed its 
55. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter 1971 Hague 
Convention].
56. Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civ-
il and Commercial Matters (Recast), art. 2, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 6 (“This Regulation shall not 
apply to . . . (b) bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or 
other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings;”); Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [herein-
after Brussels I]; Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 6, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 2; Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 
https://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux-idx.htm.
57. 1971 Hague Convention, supra note 55, art. 1 (“This Convention shall apply to de-
cisions rendered in civil or commercial matters by the courts of Contracting States. It shall not 
apply to decisions the main object of which is to determine . . . (5) questions of bankruptcy, 
compositions or analogous proceedings, including decisions which may result therefrom, and 
which relate to the validity of the acts of the debtor[.]”).
58. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 17 (2015) (“These Principles do not address the 
law governing . . . (d) insolvency;”).
59. See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The 
Problems of and Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests”, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2006).
60. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-
Related Judgments: Draft Guide to Enactment of the Model Law: Note by the Secretariat, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.151 (Sept. 20, 2017).
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own jurisprudence defining the contours of “insolvency-related.” Actually, 
because the opening of the insolvency proceedings themselves is straight-
forward to classify, the real definitional question hones in on what might be 
considered “connected matters” that arise within and are litigated in con-
junction with an insolvency case, such as an avoidance action (to pick the 
least controversial example that most would concede is insolvency-related).
The ECJ case law settled upon a formulation of jointly requiring those relat-
ed proceedings to “derive directly from the insolvency proceedings” and be 
“closely linked with them.”61 This seemingly flexible standard actually has 
some hard and fast rules, such as the cause of action cannot have accrued 
until after the filing of the petition. For example, a breach of contract dis-
pute settling a prior claim a creditor asserted against the debtor would not 
qualify under EU law as being “insolvency-related.”
The EU’s jurisprudence did not arise in a vacuum. It built upon a desire 
to foster judgment recognition, presumably as a way to strengthen the Un-
ion, by having maximal reach of the judgment recognition instruments. It 
thus took a deliberately restrictive approach to exclusions from the Brussels 
Regulation, meaning that its definitional approach to “insolvency-related” 
was intentionally crabbed and sought to interpret that term as narrowly as 
possible so as to permit concomitantly the widest application of Brussels.62
The presumable motivation was laudable: to recognize and enforce as many 
judgments as possible and foster regional international juridical coopera-
tion.63
The problem was this: some important commercial jurisdictions outside 
the EU balked at this definition. Indeed, in the context of negotiating an in-
ternational instrument specifically on the recognition and enforcement of 
insolvency-related judgments, the exact opposite approach would develop 
from the very same laudable impulse of maximizing international enforce-
ment and recognition of judgments that drove the EU’s jurisprudence. 
61. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings (Recast), recital 35, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19, 22 
[hereinafter EIR Recast]; see also id. art. 6 (“Jurisdiction for actions deriving directly from 
insolvency proceedings and closely linked with them[.]”).
62. Francisco Garcimartín, The EU Insolvency Regulation Recast: Scope and Rules on 
Jurisdiction, SSRN (Mar. 21, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2752412; see also EIR Recast, supra note 61, recital 7 (explaining that proceedings excluded 
from the Brussels I Regulation Recast should be covered by the EIR Recast, and vice versa, so 
as to “avoid regulatory loopholes between the two instruments”).
63. An interconnected motivation was that of what I call “gap-phobia,” by which I 
mean that the EU, for example, works hard to mind the gap by making sure the definition in 
the Brussels I insolvency exclusion conforms to the definition of its Insolvency Regulation’s
scope of inclusion so there is no “gap” (or, its corollary, an “overlap”) in regime coverage. 
“Certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judg-
ments hamper the sound operation of the internal market. Provisions to unify the rules of con-
flict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and to simplify the formalities with a view 
to rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of judgments from Member States bound by 
this Regulation are essential.” Brussels I, supra note 56, recital 2.
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Whereas the EU court read “insolvency-related” as narrowly as possible to 
minimize an exclusion, an insolvency-specific project would arguably want 
to read the definition as broadly as possible to maximize an inclusion, which 
these jurisdictions took to heart.
This disinclination toward European law was compounded by the list of 
examples the Secretariat provided of actions deemed insolvency-related un-
der judicial precedents (culled largely from the EU).64 Some jurisdictions’ 
delegations found these decisions incomprehensible to synthesize and so did 
not even like the EU case law, wholly apart from its restrictiveness. Further 
exacerbating matters was the procedural-institutional experience of the 
United States, which has specialized bankruptcy courts that are designed 
under its domestic insolvency law to exert maximal jurisdictional reach to 
centralize dispute resolution of bankruptcy-related matters before judicial 
experts.65 Immanent in such an institutional set-up is a belief that “bankrupt-
cy-related” should be given expansive reach. (That is indeed the approach to 
jurisdictional disputes under U.S. law.)66 For these various reasons, the 
United States was primed against cementing into the IRJ model law Euro-
pean jurisprudence that was expressly designed to define “insolvency-
related” as narrowly as possible.
A divergence seemed inevitable. The EU directly—dependently follow-
ing its path of regulation-exception jurisprudence—and the Secretariat indi-
rectly—by obliquely aiding and abetting this path dependency—were 
through the best of intentions heading off on a narrow definition road, while 
the United States, steeped in its own jurisdictional peculiarities, was setting 
quite a different, more expansive course. Also within this debate were third-
party states who, when it came time to define “insolvency-related judg-
ments,” tried to reason from first principles what a normatively preferable 
definition would be, coming to the question with neither “expansive” nor 
“restrictive” baggage.67
64. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Recognition and enforcement of Foreign Insol-
vency-Derived Judgments, at 7 nn. 10–12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.126 (Oct. 6, 2014) 
(citing Case C-111/08, SCT Industri AB v. Alpenblume AB, 2009 E.C.R. I-05655; Case C-
292/08, German Graphics v. van der Schee, 2009 E.C.R. I-08421). 
65. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 43–48 (1997), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6004–08.
66. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir.1984) (“Congress intended to 
grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might 
deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.”) A 
normative defense of this approach (were one inclined to search for one) could be to facilitate 
marshalling assets into the bankruptcy estate.
67. International law struggles with how best to define insolvency. E.g., Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements art. 2, ¶ 2(e), June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 (“This Convention 
shall not apply to the following matters - e) insolvency, composition and analogous matters;”). 
In the context of the Hague Conference texts, the term “insolvency” is intended to cover both 
the bankruptcy of individual persons and the winding up or liquidation of corporate entities 
which are insolvent. It does not cover the winding up or liquidation of corporations for rea-
sons other than insolvency, which is addressed in id. art. 2, ¶ 2(m). The term “composition”
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Interestingly, this clash was not resolved by a force of lobbying pow-
er—that is, a skirmish of the EU “vs.” the United States, each trying to rally 
supporters to their respective positions. Rather, it was through use of a the-
saurus. The challenge was to escape the baggage of EU jurisprudence that 
would likely follow were identical language taken from the EU Insolvency 
Regulation Recast and at the same time find language that was close enough 
that the EU-favoring states would not find it “too different.” Recall the risk 
of identical language is that the compelled international interpretation clause 
in the IRJ model law (and the MLCBI) fueled Rubin fear in the first place, 
so the language, for many states, had to be different from the EU’s.68 Thus, 
it was not adherence to its broad approach to jurisdiction that the United 
States insisted upon (although likely preferred) but rather the need to be free 
from the EU’s jurisprudence on the scope of insolvency-related judgments.69
So there was no objection to concept, just language. For its part, however, 
the EU was unlikely to want to junk its own test, not just for robust ego pur-
poses, but also for possible fear that doing so could be seen as a concession 
that its own internal test is non-compliant with UN standards, which implic-
itly carry a best practices imprimatur.
Neutral language was going to be required: de novo text for an interpre-
tative reboot, but not too de novo to suggest disparagement of the EU ap-
proach—hence, the suggestion above that a thesaurus was needed. Indeed, it 
was. No shortage of proposals was floated.70 The eventual finalist that made 
its way to Article 2(d)’s definition now requires that an insolvency-related 
judgment “[a]rises as consequence of or is materially associated with an in-
solvency proceeding, whether or not that insolvency proceeding has closed[, 
and is one that is] issued on or after the commencement of the insolvency 
proceeding . . . .”71
In considering the unexpected drama of Article 2(d), soft law’s ultimate 
role is hard to rate. At no point did the softness of the instrument assuage 
refers to procedures in which the debtor may enter into agreements with creditors in respect of 
a moratorium on the payment of debts or on the discharge of those debts. The term “analogous 
proceedings” covers a broad range of other methods in which insolvent persons or entities can 
be assisted to regain solvency while continuing to trade. See Masato Dogauchi & Trevor C. 
Hartley, Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements Explanatory 
Report (Dec. 2004), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd26e.pdf.
68. IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 44, art. 8 (“In the interpretation of this 
Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith.”); see also MLCBI, supra note 16 (same).
69. Perhaps as a bone thrown to the United States, the Guide to Enactment open-
endedly offers examples of what are, but not what are not, insolvency-related judgments. See
IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 44, ¶ 60.
70. There was not a lack of options. One early contender that received widespread sup-
port (later tweaked into the final version) was “stems intrinsically from or is materially associ-
ated with” an insolvency proceeding. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of Working 
Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Fifty-First Session, ¶ 77, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/903 (May 26, 2017).
71. IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 44, art. 2(d). 
494 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:479
the divergent stakeholders that their differences of opinion mattered less be-
cause it was a “mere” model law being developed that could be tinkered 
with at stage two of domestic adoption. And, perhaps smarting from the Ru-
bin decision’s spillover effects, the parties were focused on the nominally 
soft law as nascent hard law, so they were almost treating it as “hard law 
lite”—soft in name only, but with all the risks of hard law (itself a curious 
development given the repeatedly touted benefits of a model law’s softness 
as a legal technology). It is also too early to say whether European jurisdic-
tions enacting the IRJ model law will (a) modify the language of Article 
2(d) to translate it back into “proper” EU language, (b) keep the language 
and then develop through case law a position that it means basically the 
same thing as closely related (perhaps driven by gap-phobia that it must be 
so interpreted to avoid regime gaps with the EU Insolvency Regulation),72
or (c) keep the language and develop a separate gloss on its meaning as in-
terpretative case law unfolds that is specific to insolvency jurisprudence. 
Perhaps this shows the “positive” aspect of soft law, at least in a cynical 
way, of assuaging states that the harmonization-defection opportunity at the 
domestic enactment stage remains!73 While the jury, as they say, is still out, 
it does seem clear that the dialogic aspect of international law (here, 
UNCITRAL’s consideration of an already-developed EU doctrinal jurisdic-
tional test) seemed to provide more disagreement and potential for dissent 
than source of harmonizing consensus.
C. Discourse Digression: Article 15
Sometimes too much dialogue is a bad thing. This perhaps suggests a 
theory of “diminishing dialogic returns,” the full theoretical modeling of 
which—and its specific application for marital conflicts—remains beyond 
the scope of this Article. This is what might have happened with regard to 
Article 15 of the IRJ model law, where the disagreement seemed at times to 
rival that regarding Article 2.
The reader may be justifiably puzzled by reference to Article 15, which 
was not discussed previously in the above overview of the IRJ model law’s 
key provisions. Article 15 is an ancillary provision that addresses the 
“equivalent effect” of an insolvency-related judgment sought to be recog-
nized or enforced, generally providing that the judgment is to be accorded 
full faith and credit.74 It also provides, perhaps more significantly, for “ad-
72. Gap-phobia is evidenced, for example, in the EU Insolvency Regulation Recast. 
EIR Recast, supra note 61, recital 7 (“The interpretation of [the Recast] should as much as 
possible avoid regulatory loopholes between [it and the Brussels Regulation.]”). This pro-
nouncement reveals an almost conceit regarding the coherence of international law in a world 
of fragmented and overlapping regimes.
73. Conceivably, a more dramatic solution might have been to strike Article 8 and let 
each state “go it alone.” Article 8’s retention actually circumscribes the EU from getting too 
far afield in returning to its own law.
74. IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 44, art. 15.
Spring 2019] International Insolvency 495
aptation” of remedy. If relief ordered in the originating court is unavailable 
in the recognizing court (for example, injunctive relief impermissible under 
domestic law), the remedy “shall, to the extent possible, be adapted to relief 
that is equivalent to, but does not exceed, its effects under the law of the 
originating state.”75
This may cause the reader to further wonder: how on earth could such a 
banal provision generate dissent? The answer is once again found in the role 
of soft law in promoting a form of international civil discourse. If soft law 
instruments serve in part to provoke dialogue, then sometimes that dialogue 
will, and perhaps should, transcend the regime within which it is initiated. 
This is exactly what happened with Article 15, which transformed, or per-
haps devolved, into a discussion about the proposed language used to devel-
op the contemporaneous draft of the revised Hague Convention in a cognate 
international regime.76 Underscoring the role of elite repeat players among 
international drafters, the Article 15 discussion was in part an offstage re-
litigation of a Hague drafting dispute.77 The specific issue was whether the 
concept of “equivalent effects” should bestow upon the applicable judgment 
the same effect as it has in the originating state or the same effect it would 
have had if it was issued by a court of the recognizing state. Fine pinheads 
upon which the angels might dance to be sure, but a divide nonetheless. The 
Hague draft (in its earlier iterations) leaned toward the former approach, 
which was noted by countries such as Switzerland in Working Group V,78
but many countries, such as Mexico, Uganda, the United States, and China, 
favored the latter.79 And Korea noted that there were problems with both 
formulations!80
This cross-dialogue (or distracting chatter, depending on one’s perspec-
tive) about the Hague drafting influenced the IRJ model law drafting of Ar-
ticle 15 as much, if not more, than the actual normative preferences for 
which language provided superior content. This deep-dive exploration of 
preclusion law was made even all the more unusual by the United States’ 
preference for the second option, notwithstanding that its own domestic law 
on interstate recognition and enforcement of “foreign” (that is, different 
75. Id. art. 15, ¶ 2.
76. Working Group V, 52nd Session, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L. (Dec. 19, 
2017), https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/767192b9-e657-4474-
b2c3-30f110d182b2 [hereinafter 52nd Session Audio Recording].
77. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Less Is More in International Private 
Law, 3 NOTTINGHAM INSOLVENCY & BUS. L E-JOURNAL 43, 55 (2015). 
78. 52nd Session Audio Recording, supra note 76, at 10:51:06–53:53 (Switzerland). 
79. Id. 10:47:02–48:44 (China); id. 10:48:50–50:52 (United States); id. 10:56:34–57:52 
(Uganda); id. 10:58:05–59:16 (Mexico). 
80. Id. at 11:02:00–05:11 (Republic of Korea).
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state) judgments requires the first option approach of looking to the origi-
nating state’s preclusion laws.81
One possible outcome might have been for the Working Group to throw 
up its hands and deferentially say, “Let’s just settle on whatever the Hague
does,” honoring the Hague Conference’s arguably greater experience on 
matters of private international law.82 But even that possible outcome was 
unable to garner a consensus, and so the Working Group simply bracketed 
the matter at successive sessions until a breakthrough of sorts seemed possi-
ble in 2017. The UNCITRAL working groups only meet semi-annually, 
with interstitial interventions by the Secretariat, and this one expressed little 
interest in resolving the Article 15 issue. The issue would rear its head, be 
discussed, and get bracketed for further consideration a couple of times each 
year. What happened before Working Group V’s penultimate drafting ses-
sion on the IRJ model law, however, was remarkable. In the fall of 2017, 
during its most recent working session, the Hague Conference decided to 
scrap the equivalent effects clause from its draft convention altogether, cit-
ing such anesthetizing reasons as a desire not to conflate matters of issue 
preclusion with claim preclusion.83 This left UNCITRAL with a hanging 
debate on how to implement—or modify—a provision from the draft Hague 
Convention that the Hague itself decided to withdraw.
The UNCITRAL Secretariat (one assumes excitedly) quickly drew this 
development to the Working Group’s attention, presumably hoping that it 
would inspire similar deletion of Article 15 as unnecessary.84 Indeed, early 
81. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). While this is a federal law, much of the U.S. 
judgment enforcement jurisprudence is at the state level. See generally Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“[T]hough the federal courts may look to the common law or to the poli-
cies supporting res judicata and collateral estoppel in assessing the preclusive effect of deci-
sions of other federal courts, Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give pre-
clusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the 
judgments emerged would do so . . . .”).
82. Recall, however, that the Hague moves glacially, and UNCITRAL was moving 
with comparative speed.
83. FRANCISCO J. GARCIMARTÍN ALFÉREZ, JUDGMENTS CONVENTION: PRELIMINARY 
EXPLANATORY REPORT 59 (2017) (“Effects. Judgments concerning the merits of a dispute 
may have different effects, typically, substantive and procedural. The substantive or disposi-
tive effects derive from the authoritative determination made by the court as to the substance 
and content of the relationship at stake. In some jurisdictions, these effects are usually referred 
to as substantive authority of res judicata. Procedurally, a judgment may, under certain condi-
tions, prevent subsequent proceedings on the same issue (preclusion or formal res judicata). 
Furthermore, under the so-called collateral estoppel or issue preclusion doctrine, a judgment 
may also have wider effects in precluding subsequent proceedings even as regards issues that 
have not been specifically determined. The same holds with regard to the range of persons that 
are bound by the authority of the judgment. The decision may bind persons that did not take 
part in the proceedings but have a particular relationship with the parties.”).
84. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Conference Room Paper 2, ¶ 2 (Dec. 2017) (un-
published) (on file with author); Id.; see also U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of 
Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/931 (Jan. 15, 2018) (“The Working Group noted that in the most recent text emanat-
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in the discussion at the next working group meeting, a proposal was made to 
remove draft Article 15 altogether.85 But then, snatching discord from the 
jaws of easy agreement, some delegations pushed back and said, in effect, 
just because the Hague deleted it does not mean we have to, too. What be-
gan as deference to the Hague suddenly flipped into lofty indifference. As 
the delegate from Switzerland summed up, noting the irony, UNCITRAL’s 
Working Group V was neither a specialized body for nor had the purpose of 
“harmonizing principles of general procedural law” (presumably contrasting 
the Hague’s or UNIDROIT’s mandates). He nonetheless proceeded, some-
what cheekily, “we are not that modest”86 and so declined to support follow-
ing the Hague’s path of deletion. Others concurred.87
The discourse digression had sewn its distracting seed. The debate over 
the article, animated in part by a salutary attempt to engage in cross-
dialogue with the Hague Conference, took on a life of its own, persisting 
long after the Hague debate was over because the can of worms had already 
been opened. To reiterate, this was a debate—a heated one—over procedur-
al issues of preclusion law that have nothing specifically to do with insol-
vency. But perhaps due to a sense of intellectual sunk costs, the Working 
Group persuaded itself that it was now in a position to best resolve the mat-
ter for purposes of its IRJ model law. Soft law’s dialogue-promoting goal 
created a monster. And having expressly considered the question, the Work-
ing Group brushed aside the idea that it would follow the Hague’s modesty, 
promptly resurrecting the ongoing debate over which option to prefer.
With no resolution to the impasse in sight, it was also clear that an an-
cillary provision was not going to derail the IRJ model law project. Accord-
ingly, the consensus of the Working Group then became to “agree to disa-
gree” and leave the equivalent effects issue unresolved. The drafting 
solution, which found its way into the final product, was to settle for an ei-
ther/or option, requiring enacting states to pick option one or option two. 
The IRJ model law contains an asterisk on Article 15, instructing states: 
“The enacting State may wish to note that it should choose between the two 
alternatives provided in square brackets.”88 It would appear that some uni-
form model laws are not so uniform after all.
ing from the November 2017 Special Commission on Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the provision equiva-
lent to article 14 had been deleted. Having deleted the article, the Special Commission decided 
that the Explanatory Report to the draft convention should: (a) note that it was inherent in the 
concept of recognition of a judgment that the same claim (or cause of action) could not be re-
litigated in another Contracting State (res judicata); and (b) refer to the material in paragraph 
89 of the Hartley-Dogauchi Report.”).
85. 52nd Session Audio Recording, supra note 76, 10:48:50–50:52 (United States).
86. Id. 11:07:36–11:09:38 (Switzerland).
87. The Canadian delegation noted that a similar provision existed in other widely 
adopted international instruments, such as the ICSID treaty, and so some non-Hague institu-
tions “go it alone” and have equivalent effects clauses. Id. 10:54:00–10:56:21.
88. IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 44, art. 15 n.1.
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Three observations flow from the unusual experience in the drafting of 
Article 15 and yield ambiguous conclusions about the efficacy of soft law. 
First, whether the disuniformity proves to be devastating or trivial remains 
to be seen. Certainly, an option A/B approach is not unheard of in model 
law texts,89 but it is not ideal. This failure-to-harmonize aspect of the IRJ 
model law may serve as a wedge—that is, it may embolden states to start 
departing from the proposed text in other provisions at the domestic enact-
ment stage.
Second, as suggested above, sometimes too much dialogue is a bad 
thing. If soft law allows for the further percolation (and fermentation) of 
ideas and norms in the international sphere, then sometimes it might cause 
distraction and digression. Here, an enormous amount of insolvency work-
ing group intellectual effort was spent on an issue of preclusion law that an-
other, arguably more expert, body ultimately abandoned as unworkable. It is 
possible this could have been avoided if “Hague fetishism” had not beset the 
Working Group in the first place.90
Finally, it could be that the “or” solution of the IRJ model law is a 
blessing in disguise. That is, by allowing experimentation with regard to 
cross-border preclusion law principles, the IRJ model law may actually fa-
cilitate the development of a jurisprudential data set upon which future in-
ternational reforms (hard or soft) may draw. For example, if, as the United 
States feared, an option one approach will lead to difficulties in ascertaining 
the content of foreign law that will impede the recognition of insolvency-
related judgments,91 then a corpus of subsequent case law showing easy as-
certainment may diminish that concern—just as a case law replete with dif-
ficulty will confirm it. Indeed, when the Hague Conference gets back to 
drafting its convention revisions, it can look upon that body of case law, 
whatever it shows, with great interest. On this view, then, while sometimes 
digressions are digressions, sometimes they lead to serendipitous discovery. 
89. For example, the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment art. 11, Nov. 16, 2001, 
https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/aircraft-protocol, offers Contracting 
States three options on insolvency: (1) to adopt, by declaration, Alternative A of Article XI of 
the Protocol (“Alternative A”); or (2) to adopt, by declaration, Alternative B of that Article 
(“Alternative B”); or (3) to retain national insolvency law, by making no declaration (“Exist-
ing Insolvency Law Retention”).
90. It is not robust Hague fetishism, of course, because that deference vanished at the 
final cut. Rather, it was Hague fetishism coupled with the intellectual sunk cost fallacy of hav-
ing a need to resolve an issue that devoted so much drafting attention. This could be another
aspect of soft law relevant to contrasting UNCITRAL’s experience to the Hague’s. In working 
on a hard law convention, the Hague group may have been more concerned with ironing out 
each tiny nuance than UNCITRAL would have been in quickly crafting a soft law with a 
“let’s just try it” mindset.
91. 52nd Session Audio Recording, supra note 76, 10:48:50–10:50:52 (United States). 
This concern is reflected in the Guide to Enactment’s paragraph 121, which deftly plays no 
favorites in presenting the respective benefits of the two alternatives. MLCBI supra note 16, ¶ 
121.
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Again, while it is too early to tell what the legacy of this particular “disuni-
form” soft law provision will be, the experimental potential lies there wait-
ing.
D. Discourse Development: Article 14
A final article in the IRJ model law implicating its soft law capacity for 
dialogue is Article 14. It is not just its most intriguing provision but, from 
the lens of incremental development of cross-border insolvency law, its 
most promising. Moreover, it once again invites comparison to the Hague 
Conference’s efforts and roadblocks in revising its hard law convention. Ar-
ticle 14 has a paragraph dealing with indirect jurisdiction. The rules of indi-
rect jurisdiction bedevil international efforts in the field of private interna-
tional law.92 There are two opposed concerns: the excessive reach of states 
with exorbitant exercises of jurisdiction on the one hand, and the need to 
bind recalcitrant defendants who seek to evade legitimate exercises of juris-
diction on the other.93 So dysfunctional is the law in this domain that appar-
ently even concession of reciprocal recognition of jurisdiction (country x
has to recognize a judgment from country y where the basis of jurisdiction 
in y was the same as one that exists under the laws of x) is a hard sell.94 This 
came sharply into relief in the early days of drafting the IRJ model law be-
cause, of course, the Rubin decision was based on a refusal to recognize a 
judgment whose jurisdiction was not exercised in a manner concordant with 
British law. But the defendant in Rubin was, in the eyes of some, a scofflaw 
who hid from the U.S. court in an attempt (ultimately successful) to escape 
jurisdiction. In the eyes of these detractors, he would certainly have been 
accorded full due process rights and would have been able to mount an ef-
fective defense.
Recall that Article 14 lists grounds for discretionary refusal to recognize 
an insolvency-related judgment. Paragraph (g) is phrased in the negative by 
saying recognition may be refused if jurisdiction was not exercised in the 
originating court in one of the following manners.95 This has the functional 
92. Ronald A. Brand, Understanding Judgments Recognition, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 877, 889–92 (2015). “[A] problem has resulted in the failure to understand the gap 
that exists in some other legal systems between the bases of jurisdiction on which courts are 
allowed to hear a case in the first instance (bases of direct jurisdiction) and the bases of juris-
diction courts will accept as appropriate in the originating court of another state for purposes 
of the recognition of the resulting judgment (bases of indirect jurisdiction).” Id. at 880.
93. Compare, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 4 (Fr.) (basing jurisdiction 
on plaintiff’s nationality), with, e.g., Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 (allowing so-
phisticated defendant to evade jurisdiction through non-submission notwithstanding his access 
to full due process rights).
94. The most recent version of the Hague Convention’s redraft does not permit reci-
procity as a legitimate exercise of indirect jurisdiction under Article 5 (that is, jurisdiction was 
exercised in a manner permitted under the law of this state). Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements art. 22, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294.
95.
500 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:479
effect of providing a list of legitimate jurisdictional bases. It starts with low-
hanging fruit: “The court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the explicit 
consent of the party against whom the judgment was issued . . . .”96 It then 
proceeds to an idea of submission (attornment) that has been bouncing 
around the Hague Conference for some time.97 Increasing the touchiness, it 
even adds a reciprocity basis that the Hague has thus far been unwilling to 
stomach, approving of jurisdiction when the “court exercised jurisdiction on 
a basis on which a court in this State could have exercised jurisdic-
tion . . . .”98
So far, so good. In fact, so far, so excellent, as prescribing bases of indi-
rect jurisdiction is an overdue project for private international law. But none 
of these provisions “fixes Rubin.” Recall that the Rubin defendant neither 
consented nor attorned to U.S. jurisdiction, and the whole ratio of the deci-
sion was that U.S. jurisdiction was not based on a ground reciprocally found 
under U.K. law. Accordingly, a fourth, catch-all category was needed to 
mean something like jurisdiction was exercised in a non-exorbitant manner, 
even if that ground is unavailable under domestic law. Early efforts talking 
of “reasonable” grounds were quickly dismissed by jurisdictions whose 
judges would find such ambiguity anathema (presumably where those judg-
es are not versed in exercising wide swaths of discretionary power, especial-
ly with concepts such as jurisdiction).
Singapore came up with the final ground that made its way into the text: 
“The court exercised jurisdiction on a basis that was not incompatible with 
the law of this State . . . .”99 This ground is listed directly after the reciproci-
ty ground, textually indicating that it requires different and hence necessari-
ly broader reach.100 For the avoidance of doubt, the GTE clarifies that the 
In addition to the ground set forth in article 7, recognition and enforcement of an 
insolvency-related judgment may be refused if: . . . (g) The originating court did not 
satisfy one of the following conditions: (i) The court exercised jurisdiction on the 
basis of the explicit consent of the party against whom the judgment was issued; (ii) 
The court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the submission of the party against 
whom the judgment was issued, namely that that party argued on the merits before 
the court without objecting to jurisdiction or to the exercise of jurisdiction within 
the time frame provided in the law of the originating State, unless it was evident 
that such an objection to jurisdiction would not have succeeded under that law; (iii) 
The court exercised jurisdiction on a basis on which a court in this State could have 
exercised jurisdiction; or (iv) The court exercised jurisdiction on a basis that was 
not incompatible with the law of this State . . . .
IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 44, art. 14(g).
96. Id. art. 14(g)(i).
97. Id. art. 14(g)(ii).
98. Id. art. 14(g)(iii).
99. IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 44, art. 14(g)(iv). Singapore’s initial ver-
sion was slightly different linguistically, but the concept was the same. 
100. Specifically, “not incompatible” cannot be conflated with “compatible,” the textual-
ly distinct prior ground for permissible indirect jurisdiction.
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purpose of this provision is to allow for some “margin of appreciation,” 
“acceptance of outcome differences,” or whatever legal term of art one may 
wish to use to mean that it’s OK to be un-British:
Subparagraph (g)(iv) is similar to subparagraph (g)(iii), but broad-
er. While subparagraph (g)(iii) is limited to jurisdictional grounds 
explicitly permitted under the law of the receiving State, subpara-
graph (g)(iv) applies to any additional jurisdictional grounds which, 
while not explicitly grounds upon which the receiving court could 
have exercised jurisdiction, are nevertheless not incompatible with 
the law of the receiving State. The purpose of subparagraph (g)(iv) 
is to discourage courts from refusing recognition and enforcement 
of a judgment in cases in which the originating court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction was not unreasonable, even if the precise basis of juris-
diction would not be available in the receiving State, provided that 
exercise was not incompatible with the central tenets of procedural 
fairness in the receiving State.101
This language from the GTE is a thinly veiled (if veiled at all) rebuke of 
Rubin. It also shows that Article 14(g)(iv) could be the start of a new signif-
icant strand of private international law that provides a doctrinal anchor for 
meaningful expansion (and a coherent foundation) for indirect jurisdic-
tion.102 Consider the success of the MLCBI’s public policy clause (which 
follows from public order exceptions from treaties).103 This potentially co-
operation-unravelling provision has happily been interpreted quite restric-
tively—silencing alarmists who saw it as a backdoor—and constrained the 
jingoistic impulses of states.104 So, too, could Article 14(g)(iv) similarly 
constrain those same impulses of states predisposed to consider their way or 
the highway in jurisdictional matters. For that potential to take off, however, 
a “reverse” Hague deference will need to unfold: rather than UNCITRAL 
bending over backward to accommodate language used by the EU’s or the
Hague’s drafting, those institutions will need to look at the case law that de-
velops interpreting UNCITRAL’s IRJ model law.105 Indeed, the cross-
dialogue of international law might work well in this regard as the EU con-
101. IRJ MODEL LAW AND GUIDE, supra note 44, ¶ 115. 
102. In fact, Article 14(g)(iii) might itself be a breakthrough, but it is a breakthrough in a 
longstanding debate. Article 14(g)(iv) blazes an even more novel path.
103. MLCBI, supra note 16, art. 6.
104. For example, in In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), the court found a 
violation of public policy by a German insolvency representative’s request to get access to the 
debtor’s email, which may have triggered criminal liability in the United States.
105. The Guide to Enactment’s caveat regarding “central tenets of procedural fairness”
makes clear that exorbitant bases of jurisdiction need not be appreciated under the margin. It 
is possible, of course, that similar work could have been done through the public policy clause 
of Article 7, but that might have required more resort to Article 7 than desired under a restric-
tive approach to its usage. It is also at least arguable that central tenets of procedural fairness 
need not necessarily rise to the level of manifest public policy.
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cept of a “margin of appreciation” could even be deployed in interpreting 
the scope of Article 14(g)(iv).106
III.  Reconsidering the Role of Soft Law in the 
IRJ Model Law Discourse
Analysis of the IRJ model law reveals a process demonstrating soft 
law’s potential for experimentalism and for catalyzing dialogue, both within 
and across “regimes.”107 But that experimental potential also has a dark side: 
too much dialogue can lead to distraction, with participants careering madly 
off in all directions. Taking the three specific articles discussed in some de-
tail above, we can tentatively conclude the following, starting with the nega-
tive and ending with the positive. First, the definition of “insolvency-
related” in Article 2 showed the challenges of consideration of cognate re-
gimes in international law. Many EU delegates wanted to use the doctrinal 
scaffolding from their own case law, as subsequently embodied in hard law 
instruments such as the Insolvency Regulation Recast. Other delegates did 
not want to be locked into that path, seeing it as having developed unhelpful 
jurisprudence. The compelled international interpretation provision from the 
MLCBI (and ultimately the IRJ model law), far from fostering international 
cooperation in this case, seemed to have induced anxiety. Exploiting soft 
law’s capacity for experimentation, consensus-builders suggested a different 
definition employing a different phraseology, although a similar conceptual 
idea, to avoid the precedential risk of renegade jurisdictions. Whether this 
other path proves durable when the IRJ model law makes the transformation 
from soft to hard law in Europe, however, remains to be seen; but the glass 
starts half full.
Second, the unexpected impasse on Article 15’s “equivalent effects” 
clause shows that deference and consideration of other international organi-
zations (here, the Hague Conference) is alive and well in the insolvency re-
gime. No turf warfare was evinced here. But Article 15’s drafting also 
shows that such deference has limits. Maybe the digression on preclusion 
law was a fluke, ill-suited for generalization. And it arguably started with 
good intentions (cross-regime consideration of a cognate endeavor). Here, 
however, it seems too much consideration of the revised Hague Conven-
tion’s inchoate drafting just ended up creating confusion—confusion that 
the Hague Conference ultimately eschewed. The end result, an ugly spot of 
106. The irony that this sunny view of Article 14(g)(iv)’s potential requires overcoming 
the anxiety revealed in the drafting of Article 2 does not escape me. The difference is hind-
sight: Article 2 was drafted after some states knew there was (in their minds) a bad outcome. 
It is noteworthy that Article 8 on compelled international interpretation persists in the IRJ 
model law, suggesting that anxiety is surmountable.
107. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as In-
tervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185, 185 (1982) (“International regimes [are institutional 
factors effecting cooperation] defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making proce-
dures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area.”).
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disuniformity in an otherwise uniform model law, may not be that big a 
deal. Or it may have a spillover effect to invite textual deviation at the do-
mestic enactment stage. Again, the half-full aspect of experimentation is 
that this may generate a natural experiment with the two approaches that 
may trickle back to the Hague Conference should it revisit the issue.
Finally, the advancement of a new basis of indirect jurisdiction under 
Article 14 is potentially the most significant aspect of the IRJ model law. 
The reason for its inclusion was a concerted effort to “fix Rubin.”108 And 
Rubin’s need for fixing, in turn, stemmed from the soft law framework ap-
proach of the MLCBI: the United Kingdom exploited a position the soft 
law’s imprecision allowed. It generated backlash, and the international 
community responded when it became time to take the precision to the next 
level of specificity.109 Soft law’s dialogue begat a soft law response. This is 
the area where the potential for soft law’s dialogic effect on international 
law could be most promising if for no other reason than the promulgation of 
a doctrinal anchor.110 The IRJ model law may thus ultimately offer a trans-
formative development in cross-border matters of indirect jurisdiction.
The lingering question, then, is what role did the softness of the IRJ 
model law play? That is, could experimentation and dialogue have occurred 
just as easily with negotiation of a hard law convention? Possibly. But the 
softness of the instrument made it easier to negotiate and finalize, with the 
cognate Hague Conference’s languid pace serving as a marked contrast. 
Moreover, this softness of the instrument made more tolerable the “option 
A/B” pseudo-resolution of the Article 14 impasse, a punt that is not unprec-
edented but can be awkward.111 Future disputes will test the long-term dura-
bility of Article 14’s pseudo-resolution, but at least at this early stage, the 
“option A/B” provisions garnered widespread support—indeed, no parties 
suggested alterations to Working Group V’s product at the Commission.112
Thus, although too early to pronounce with certainty, the IRJ model law 
seems to be another example of successful incremental reform in interna-
tional insolvency through the use of soft law.
108. Probably too detailed for this article is the IRJ Model Law’s “infamous” Article X, 
which purports to amend the MLCBI by simply clarifying judgment recognition is an availa-
ble remedy. This innovation of a cross-reference to another model law that enacting states 
may or may not have enacted is cumbersome but rational.
109. So-called “framework conventions” are broadly inclusive, non-threatening agree-
ments that do not contain deep substantive commitments or perforce strong enforcement pro-
cedures. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14.
110. Of course, skeptical states can try to strangle that development and cabin the IRJ 
model law to being restricted to insolvency only.
111. See, e.g., Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, supra note 89.
112. Working Group V, 54th Session, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L.,11:55:47–
58:35 (Chair) (Dec. 10, 2018), https://icms.unov.org/CarbonWeb/public/uncitral/speakerslog/
9c566f0f-bd64-4855-bb62-c942d6c70120.

